Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff sought medical treatment for vision issues and was referred to a board-certified ophthalmologist, who performed cataract surgery on both eyes in March and April 2018. After follow-up appointments and an additional procedure on one eye, the plaintiff’s vision improved compared to before surgery. However, nearly a year later, he experienced retinal detachments in both eyes, which required surgical repairs by another physician. Following these procedures, the plaintiff suffered diminished vision in both eyes.The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint in the District Court for Douglas County, asserting that the physician failed to obtain informed consent prior to the cataract surgeries, particularly by not discussing specific risks associated with prior radial keratotomy (RK) procedures. The physician answered that he met the applicable standard of care and denied any negligence or causation. The district court initially granted summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, but the Nebraska Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding the limitations defense had not been properly raised. On remand, after the plaintiff failed to designate any expert witnesses by the deadline, the physician again moved for summary judgment, offering his own affidavit and evidence that the plaintiff had no expert to testify at trial. The plaintiff responded with depositions and affidavits asserting he was not informed of relevant risks and would have declined surgery if properly informed.The Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed the case de novo and held that, although there was a factual dispute regarding whether the physician breached the standard of care in obtaining informed consent, the plaintiff failed to present competent evidence on proximate causation, an essential element of his claim. The Court found expert testimony was required to establish causation and rejected arguments based on the common knowledge exception and “self-evident damages.” The judgment of the district court granting summary judgment for the physician was affirmed. View "Schuemann v. Timperley" on Justia Law

A woman experienced a difficult third pregnancy, complicated by multiple medical issues that warranted an early, medically induced labor. Before delivery, she signed a consent form authorizing her obstetrician to perform a vaginal delivery with possible laceration/episiotomy repairs and possible cesarean section. During labor, as the infant was crowning, she pleaded with her doctor not to perform an episiotomy, but the procedure was carried out. She later required reconstructive surgery due to complications from the episiotomy.She initiated legal action in the Hinds County Circuit Court against her obstetrician, the medical group, and other entities, alleging lack of informed consent and battery related to the episiotomy, along with other claims against additional defendants. Over time, the trial court issued a series of orders dismissing various claims and defendants, culminating in summary judgment for the obstetrician on the informed consent and battery claims, primarily due to the plaintiff’s failure to provide expert medical testimony. The plaintiff argued that expert testimony was unnecessary because she had withdrawn consent during labor, but the court disagreed.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case. It held that while a medical procedure performed without consent may constitute battery and not require expert testimony, this scenario involved consent given prior to delivery and alleged withdrawal during labor. In such cases, it is necessary to prove that stopping the procedure was medically feasible and would not cause harm, which requires expert testimony. The Court affirmed the trial court’s summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff’s lack of expert evidence prevented her claims from proceeding, and upheld the trial court’s denial of reconsideration. View "Brown v. Davey-Sullivan" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment at a state medical center for vision issues and was diagnosed with idiopathic intracranial hypertension. She initially chose medication over surgery but later agreed to undergo an optic-nerve sheath fenestration. Following continued vision decline, she received a shunt placement. Shortly after this procedure, she and her mother discussed concerns about her treatment, expressing suspicions that something had gone wrong and that she should seek care elsewhere. The patient continued follow-up visits at the center, but months later obtained a second medical opinion, which suggested prior care had been incorrect and provided an alternative diagnosis.The patient filed a notice of claim against the medical center more than a year after her suspicions of negligence but within a year of receiving the second opinion. She then filed suit for medical negligence. The University of Mississippi Medical Center moved for summary judgment in the Hinds County Circuit Court, arguing the claim was time barred under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act’s one-year statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, finding a genuine issue as to when the patient discovered the alleged negligence.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the denial of summary judgment de novo. It held that the statute of limitations began running when the patient first suspected negligent care, as shown by her own statements and those of her mother shortly after the shunt procedure, not when she received the second opinion. The court found no genuine issue of material fact that her suspicions triggered the limitations period, making her claim time barred. The court reversed the trial court’s decision and rendered summary judgment in favor of the medical center. View "University of Mississippi Medical Center v. Carter" on Justia Law

Mary Margaret Upchurch, who suffered from chronic back pain, underwent multiple surgeries involving spinal cord stimulators and pain pumps. In 2016, after moving to Mississippi, she had a pain pump replaced by Dr. Adam Lewis, a neurosurgeon at Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. During surgery, Dr. Lewis attempted to replace the battery of her spinal cord stimulator with one from a different manufacturer, but encountered issues with the compatibility of the leads. This led to additional procedures, including a laminectomy and the eventual replacement of the stimulator, after which Mary experienced severe neurological complications, including paralysis. The Upchurches alleged that Dr. Lewis failed to properly prepare for surgery, did not obtain informed consent, and failed to communicate adequately with hospital staff.The case was tried in the Rankin County Circuit Court, where the jury found in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic, concluding there was no negligence in Dr. Lewis’s care. The circuit court entered judgment on the jury’s verdict and denied the Upchurches’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new trial. The Upchurches appealed, and the Mississippi Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s judgment, finding insufficient evidence supported the jury’s verdict and remanding the case for a new trial.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the Upchurches’ failure to object to Dr. Lewis’s testimony at trial constituted waiver, and that his unobjected-to testimony should have been considered as evidence. The Court found sufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, and reinstated and affirmed the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Dr. Lewis and Jackson Neurosurgery Clinic. Additionally, the Court affirmed the circuit court’s order assessing appellate record costs against Dr. Lewis and the Clinic. View "Upchurch v. Lewis" on Justia Law

The case centers on the tragic death of a young woman who was murdered by her former romantic partner shortly after he was discharged from a psychiatric hospital. The partner had previously expressed homicidal ideations toward her, both to medical staff and law enforcement, and was involuntarily committed under Connecticut law for psychiatric disabilities and being a danger to others. After a brief stay, he was discharged from the psychiatric facility with no further supervision or warning provided to either the victim or law enforcement. The plaintiff, administratrix of the victim’s estate, sued the mental health care provider, alleging both ordinary negligence and medical malpractice for failing to protect the victim from a known risk.The Superior Court in the judicial district of Hartford granted the provider’s motion to strike, finding that all claims sounded in medical malpractice since the alleged negligence involved medical judgment relating to diagnosis and treatment. Relying on Jarmie v. Troncale, the court concluded that, under Connecticut law, medical malpractice actions can only be brought by patients, and since the victim was not a patient, the claims were barred. The court also determined that Connecticut does not recognize gross negligence as a separate cause of action.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut reviewed the trial court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that some allegations did implicate medical malpractice and were barred, but others, liberally construed, sounded in ordinary negligence. These included claims that the provider actually knew of a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party and failed to take reasonable steps to protect or warn her. The Court, for the first time, recognized a limited duty: a mental health care provider who knows a patient poses a substantial risk of imminent harm to an identifiable third party must take reasonable steps to protect that party, which may include warning or controlling the patient. The judgment was reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings on the ordinary negligence claims. View "Ashworth v. Branford" on Justia Law

After surgery to remove an ovarian cyst in May 2019, April S. Clark suffered a bowel perforation and subsequent complications while under the care of several doctors. She ultimately died in June 2019. Her husband, Charles Clark, and her daughter, April D. Clark, brought wrongful death claims against Dr. Thomas Leigh, Dr. William Shirley, and OB/GYN Specialists, LLP, alleging negligent post-operative care. At trial in July 2024, the jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the full value of Clark’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.Following the verdict, the defendants filed post-trial motions seeking to apply the statutory cap on noneconomic damages under OCGA § 51-13-1(b), which limits such awards in medical malpractice actions to $350,000. The State Court of Bibb County granted the motion to remit and amend the judgment, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 but leaving the pain and suffering and medical expenses awards unchanged. The court denied the motion for new trial.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the constitutionality and application of the statutory damages cap. The Court reaffirmed its prior decision in Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, holding that the Georgia Constitution’s right to trial by jury prohibits applying the cap to damages for pain and suffering and loss of consortium in medical malpractice actions. The Court further determined that, as a matter of statutory construction, OCGA § 51-13-1(b) cannot operate in cases where a verdict includes damages to which Nestlehutt applies, since the statute requires combining all noneconomic damages into a single capped amount. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s amended judgment and remanded for consideration of the defendants’ remaining claim regarding excessiveness of the wrongful death award. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman who was diagnosed with placenta previa during her pregnancy developed placenta accreta spectrum (PAS) during a cesarean section at a hospital, which led to a massive hemorrhage and an emergent hysterectomy. After extensive surgery, she was moved to the ICU for monitoring. The ICU physician and a medical staffing agency were responsible for her care there. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children sued the ICU doctor and the staffing agency, alleging medical malpractice and wrongful death. The plaintiffs presented expert testimony regarding deviations from the standard of care by the ICU doctor.The Superior Court of Rockdale County presided over the trial. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only the ICU physician and the staffing agency. The jury found both defendants liable, awarding $10 million to the estate for pain and suffering and $32 million to the children for wrongful death. After trial, the defendants moved for a new trial and, alternatively, to amend the judgment to apply a statutory cap on noneconomic damages. The court denied both motions, concluding the cap had been waived and, in the alternative, that the statutory cap was unconstitutional. The plaintiffs were awarded attorney fees under Georgia law after the defendants rejected a qualifying settlement offer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appeal. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding portions of the defendants’ expert testimony, nor did it err in its jury instructions, as any alleged error was affirmatively waived by the defendants. The Court also held, consistent with its contemporaneous decision in Clark v. Leigh and Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases cannot constitutionally be applied to the jury’s verdict in this case. The award of attorney fees to the plaintiffs was affirmed. Judgment affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

A pregnant patient was admitted to a medical center, where she suffered an anaphylactic reaction to medication administered for a streptococcus infection. Her treating physician and hospital staff provided various treatments but did not administer epinephrine, a standard treatment for anaphylaxis. The patient’s child was born with severe brain injuries, which the plaintiff alleged were caused by the anaphylactic episode and the defendants’ failure to use epinephrine. The plaintiff sued the physician and medical entities for healthcare liability, contending that the physician’s decision not to use epinephrine fell below the standard of care and that the hospital staff was negligent in monitoring.After an initial trial ended in a defense verdict but was set aside due to evidentiary errors, a second jury trial again resulted in a verdict for the defendants. Following the second trial, it was discovered that a juror had, during deliberations, conducted personal research by reading an EpiPen warning label at home and shared its contents with the other jurors. The plaintiff moved for a new trial, arguing this extraneous information affected the verdict. The Circuit Court for Knox County denied the motion, ruling the plaintiff had not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the jury was influenced by the information.On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed, holding the trial court had applied the wrong legal standard and that prejudice should be presumed when jurors are exposed to extraneous, material information. The defendants then sought review.The Supreme Court of Tennessee held that, in civil cases involving the constitutional right to a jury trial, courts must use a burden-shifting framework: the party challenging a verdict must first prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury was exposed to material extraneous information, which triggers a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The party defending the verdict must then show there is no reasonable possibility the information altered the verdict. The Court vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded for the trial court to apply this framework. View "Collier ex rel. Chayce C. v. Roussis" on Justia Law

A patient died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism after being seen at a hospital for chest pain, and his estate, through its personal representative, brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors and the hospital. The alleged malpractice occurred on July 16, 2020. The personal representative received authority to act for the estate on June 7, 2021, sent a notice of intent to sue to defendants on February 10, 2023, and filed the complaint on August 14, 2023.The Genesee Circuit Court, applying Michigan Supreme Court precedent from Waltz v Wyse, granted summary disposition for defendants, holding the suit time-barred because the statutory extension for personal representatives in wrongful death actions (under MCL 600.5852) was not subject to tolling during the notice-of-intent period. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, stating it was bound by Waltz. The Michigan Supreme Court initially denied a bypass application but later ordered oral argument on whether Waltz was correctly decided and whether it should be retained under stare decisis.The Michigan Supreme Court overruled Waltz, holding that MCL 600.5852 does incorporate a limitations period and is subject to tolling under MCL 600.5856, which includes tolling for the 182-day notice-of-intent period required in medical malpractice actions. The Court concluded that the Legislature intended for personal representatives to benefit from this tolling and that there was no statutory or policy basis to exclude wrongful death actions from such tolling. The Court also determined that stare decisis did not justify retaining Waltz. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Ernest v. Brown" on Justia Law

A woman was admitted to a hospital in Twin Falls, Idaho, after displaying confusion and an inability to communicate. Her husband brought her prescribed medication bottles, including Nardil, to the hospital and recalls showing them to various nurses and possibly the attending physician. Despite this, the attending physician prescribed her Paxil, a medication that her psychiatrist had previously discontinued due to its contraindication with Nardil. The woman was administered Paxil while on Nardil and died two days later. Her husband and sons filed a medical malpractice suit against the attending physician and the hospital, alleging that the failure to document and consider her current medication led to her death.The case was first heard in the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County. The plaintiffs and defendants engaged in extended discovery, including disputes over timely disclosure of expert witnesses and hospital policies. The district court ultimately excluded the plaintiffs’ key expert testimony, finding it untimely or lacking sufficient foundation, and held that without admissible expert evidence, the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case under Idaho’s Medical Malpractice Act. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and later denied the plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration. The plaintiffs appealed, but failed to serve their notice of appeal on the defendants, prompting a motion to dismiss the appeal.The Idaho Supreme Court determined that the plaintiffs’ failure to serve the notice of appeal was not a jurisdictional defect requiring dismissal. The court found error in the district court’s decision to strike the plaintiffs’ expert’s declaration, holding that the expert had sufficient foundation to opine on the standard of care. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment as to the physician, allowing the case to proceed, but affirmed summary judgment for the hospital regarding nursing staff. The case was remanded for further proceedings, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs. View "Thaete v. St. Luke's Magic Valley Center" on Justia Law