Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Adria Snover, represented by her spouse and guardian ad litem, suffered permanent brain injury and entered a coma following complications during a cesarean section. She sued Dr. Aruna Gupta, Riverside Community Hospital, and another doctor, alleging negligent diagnosis and treatment. Before trial, Snover settled with the hospital for $2.5 million and with the other doctor for $1 million. The hospital’s settlement included $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son for waiving a potential future wrongful death claim. The case proceeded to trial solely against Dr. Gupta.A jury in the Riverside County Superior Court awarded Snover $17,458,474 in total damages: $7,458,474 in economic damages and $10 million in noneconomic damages. The jury found Gupta 15 percent at fault, the other doctor 80 percent, and a nurse 5 percent. After trial, the court applied the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA) cap to the noneconomic damages, reducing them to $250,000, and then held Gupta liable for 15 percent of that amount ($37,500). For economic damages, the court used the Mayes rule, first applying the MICRA cap, then calculating the percentage of economic damages and applying that percentage to the settlement amounts, resulting in a setoff of $3,142,750. The court did not exclude the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son from the setoff calculation.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that the trial court correctly applied the MICRA cap before apportioning liability for noneconomic damages among health care providers, consistent with Gilman v. Beverly California Corp. and Rashidi v. Moser. The court also affirmed the use of the Mayes rule for calculating the economic damages setoff and found no abuse of discretion in including the $250,000 allocated to Snover’s son. The judgment was affirmed. View "Snover v. Gupta" on Justia Law

A patient underwent a laparoscopic bilateral tubal ligation and endometrial ablation performed by a physician at a women’s clinic. About a week after the procedure, she experienced severe abdominal pain and was hospitalized for sepsis. An exploratory surgery revealed a perforated small bowel, which was surgically repaired. The patient subsequently recovered.The patient filed a medical negligence lawsuit in the Hinds County Circuit Court against the clinic and the physician, attaching the required certificate of expert consultation to her complaint. The defendants moved for summary judgment, supporting their motion with an expert affidavit. The plaintiff did not timely file an expert affidavit or testimony in response. On the day before the scheduled summary judgment hearing, she filed a response without any expert affidavit. The circuit court denied the summary judgment motion and granted her an additional thirty days to obtain an expert affidavit. After she submitted an expert affidavit and a second hearing was held, the circuit court again denied summary judgment, finding that the competing expert affidavits created a genuine issue of material fact.On interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed the circuit court’s denial of summary judgment de novo and its grant of additional time for abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court held that, in medical malpractice cases, a plaintiff must produce sworn expert testimony to survive summary judgment. The court found that the plaintiff failed to provide such testimony before the initial hearing and that the circuit court abused its discretion by granting additional time without a specific finding of diligence or good faith. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court’s judgment and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Lakeland Premier Women's Clinic, PLLC v. Jackson" on Justia Law

A woman with COVID-19 and multiple underlying health conditions was admitted to a hospital and then transferred to a skilled nursing facility for ongoing treatment. During her stay at the facility, she was under the care of a physician who prescribed various treatments for her COVID-19 infection. Despite these interventions, her condition deteriorated, and she developed additional complications, including pressure wounds and dehydration. After being discharged from the facility without hospice or home health arrangements, she was readmitted to the hospital, where her condition continued to decline. She was eventually discharged home under hospice care and died shortly thereafter. Her surviving spouse filed a wrongful death lawsuit, alleging that the facility and physician were negligent in her care.The District Court of Garfield County granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, finding that they were immune from liability under both the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act and Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act. The district court reasoned that the acts and omissions in question were incident to the provision of care for a COVID-19 patient and thus fell within the scope of the immunity statutes. The plaintiff appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case de novo. It held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of immunity. The court found that the defendants failed to provide evidence establishing a causal relationship between the administration or use of covered countermeasures and the plaintiff’s injuries, as required for PREP Act immunity. Additionally, the court determined that the defendants did not meet the evidentiary burden to show the requisite impact under the state COVID-19 Act, and that a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding gross negligence. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "AUSTBO v. GREENBRIAR" on Justia Law

A mother, acting on behalf of her mentally incapacitated adult daughter, brought suit against a hospital, its health partners, and a registered nurse after her daughter suffered an anoxic brain injury. The injury occurred when the nurse, while cleaning the patient, dislodged the patient’s cuffed tracheostomy tube, which had been placed to treat COVID-19 pneumonia. The tube was out for approximately seven minutes, resulting in cardiac arrest and brain injury. The patient had been admitted with COVID-19 and was receiving oxygen through the tracheostomy at the time of the incident.The defendants moved to dismiss the case in the District Court of Oklahoma County, arguing that the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparation (PREP) Act provided them immunity from suit and liability, thereby depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court considered documentary evidence submitted by the defendants and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff appealed, and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the district court, finding that the trial court had jurisdiction and that the defendants were not immune from suit.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case on certiorari. It held that the cuffed tracheostomy was a “covered countermeasure” under the PREP Act, the claims had a causal relationship with the administration and use of that countermeasure, and the defendants qualified as “covered persons.” The court found that the PREP Act confers both immunity from liability and suit for such claims, except for willful misconduct, which must be brought exclusively in federal court. Therefore, Oklahoma courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. View "FRANKLIN v. OU MEDICINE" on Justia Law

The case concerns the medical treatment of a fifty-eight-year-old man who suffered a shoulder injury and subsequently died from septic shock, acute septic arthritis, metabolic acidosis, and renal failure. After his initial visit to the emergency department, he was diagnosed with rotator cuff tendinitis and cellulitis, and discharged with antibiotics. His condition worsened over several weeks, leading to multiple emergency department visits and consultations with various medical providers, including nurse practitioner Michael Collins. Collins attended to the patient on August 4-5, 2020, and discharged him after administering fluids and pain medication, advising follow-up with orthopedics. The patient returned to the hospital two days later in a deteriorated state, was diagnosed with sepsis and septic arthritis, and died shortly thereafter.The plaintiff, acting as personal representative of the decedent’s estate, filed a medical malpractice action in the Massachusetts Superior Court against several providers, including Collins. The plaintiff submitted an offer of proof supported by medical records and expert opinion, alleging that Collins failed to meet the standard of care by not recognizing symptoms of septic arthritis, failing to order appropriate imaging and bloodwork, and not admitting the patient for further treatment. Collins and other defendants requested a medical malpractice tribunal under G. L. c. 231, § 60B. The tribunal found the plaintiff’s evidence insufficient to raise a legitimate question of liability against Collins, leading to dismissal of the claims after the plaintiff did not post the required bond.The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed the tribunal’s decision. It held that the tribunal erred in finding the plaintiff’s offer of proof insufficient, as the expert opinion was factually based and rooted in the medical records, and adequately raised a legitimate question of liability and causation. The Court vacated the judgment of dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s claims against Collins to proceed without posting a bond. View "Bennett v. Collins" on Justia Law

The plaintiff underwent a vein-ablation procedure on her right leg in August 2016, performed by a physician other than the defendant. She subsequently developed an infection and was treated by the defendant, who performed several irrigation and debridement procedures over the following months. In March 2017, a 4" x 4" piece of gauze was removed from the plaintiff’s wound, raising questions about whether it had been negligently left in the wound during one of the defendant’s procedures or during subsequent wound care. The plaintiff filed a medical-malpractice complaint in July 2018, alleging that the defendant left a sponge in her body during a September 2016 surgery, which the defendant denied ever performing.The Shelby Circuit Court initially denied the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, allowing the plaintiff to proceed with her claims. After depositions and further discovery, the plaintiff sought to amend her complaint to correct the date of the alleged negligent procedure from September 21, 2016, to October 26, 2016, but continued to reference a vein ablation rather than the actual irrigation and debridement procedure. The defendant moved to strike the amended complaint, arguing undue delay and lack of specificity as required by the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA). The circuit court denied the motion to strike and allowed the amendment.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case on a petition for writ of mandamus. It held that the plaintiff’s delay in amending her complaint was truly inordinate and unexplained, especially given the information available to her and the defendant’s repeated assertion of his rights under AMLA § 6-5-551. The court found that the circuit court exceeded its discretion by allowing the amendment and directed it to vacate its order granting leave to amend and to strike the plaintiff’s first amended complaint. The petition for writ of mandamus was granted. View "Ex parte Taylor" on Justia Law

The plaintiff received medical care at Sanford medical facilities in Fargo, North Dakota, in April 2022. He alleged that Sanford and its staff, including nurse Shannon Mulinex, refused to provide him pain medication, verbally abused and humiliated him, failed to investigate his complaints, engaged in a pattern of hostile conduct, and discharged him against his wishes. Based on these events, he brought six claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), as well as claims for general negligence, defamation, discrimination, and violation of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act.The District Court of Cass County, East Central Judicial District, reviewed the case after Sanford moved for summary judgment. Sanford argued that the plaintiff failed to serve an expert affidavit within three months as required by North Dakota law for professional negligence claims, and that the IIED claims did not allege conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous. The district court denied the plaintiff’s oral motion for a continuance, finding he had received adequate notice of the hearing. The court granted summary judgment, dismissing all claims, concluding that several IIED claims required an expert affidavit and the remaining IIED claims did not meet the legal threshold for extreme and outrageous conduct. A supplemental order granted summary judgment to Mulinex for the same reasons.On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Dakota affirmed the district court’s amended judgment. The Supreme Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a continuance, that the plaintiff had not preserved the issue of additional discovery for appeal, and that the requirement for an expert affidavit applied to IIED claims involving medical decisions. The court further held that the conduct alleged in the remaining IIED claims did not rise to the level of extreme and outrageous conduct as a matter of law. The amended judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "McMahon v. Sanford" on Justia Law

A 68-year-old man experiencing abdominal pain was brought to a hospital emergency room in Bayamón, Puerto Rico, in January 2016. After a delayed CT scan revealed a perforated intestine, he underwent surgery and remained in intensive care until his death in February 2016. His son, a physician residing in Florida, later learned of the seriousness of his father’s condition during a visit. The son filed a lawsuit against several doctors, the hospital, and related entities, alleging that negligent medical care led to his father’s death.The United States District Court for the District of Puerto Rico reviewed the case after a contentious discovery period. The court granted summary judgment in favor of five defendants: three doctors, a corporate entity managing the emergency room, and the emergency room’s medical director. The court found that the claims against the doctors and the corporate entity were time-barred under Puerto Rico’s one-year statute of limitations for tort claims, and that Puerto Rico law did not provide a basis for liability against the medical director, as he had not directly treated the patient. The court also disregarded certain evidence submitted by the plaintiff and denied his motion for reconsideration.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the district court erred in converting two doctors’ motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment without giving the plaintiff adequate notice or an opportunity to present evidence. The appellate court also held that the district court abused its discretion in disregarding the plaintiff’s declaration regarding when he learned of one doctor’s involvement. The court vacated and remanded the summary judgments for the three doctors and the medical director on the first cause of action, but affirmed summary judgment for the corporate entity and the medical director on the second cause of action. Each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "Calderon-Amezquita v. Rivera-Cruz" on Justia Law

A patient was involuntarily admitted to a hospital for mental health treatment due to dementia-related aggression. During his stay, he developed and experienced worsening pressure ulcers. After being transferred to another facility, he died ten days later. The estate of the patient filed a wrongful death and survival action against the hospital, alleging negligence and corporate negligence in the care and treatment of the patient’s pressure ulcers, claiming these injuries contributed to his decline and death.The Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas granted the hospital’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that the hospital’s care for the pressure ulcers was incidental to the patient’s mental health treatment. The court concluded that, under Section 114 of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), the hospital was immune from liability for ordinary negligence because the care provided was coincident to mental health treatment, and the complaint did not allege willful misconduct or gross negligence. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed this decision, holding that the immunity provision of the MHPA applied to the hospital’s conduct.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reviewed whether the MHPA’s immunity provision applied to the hospital’s treatment of the patient’s physical ailments during his mental health admission. The Court held that the MHPA’s immunity provision covers not only treatment directly related to mental illness but also medical care coincident to mental health treatment, including foreseeable physical complications like pressure ulcers. Because the estate’s complaint alleged only ordinary negligence and not gross negligence or willful misconduct, the Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order granting judgment on the pleadings in favor of the hospital. View "Wunderly v. Saint Luke's Hosp." on Justia Law

A patient alleged that she suffered a neck fracture after falling from her hospital bed while medicated and unattended at a hospital. She filed a complaint against the hospital within the one-year statute of limitations for medical claims, also naming ten John Doe defendants described as unknown medical providers involved in her care. The hospital was served and answered the complaint, but the plaintiff did not obtain summonses or attempt service on the John Doe defendants. Several months later, with the hospital’s consent, she amended her complaint to replace the John Doe defendants with specific individuals and entities, including two doctors and a medical group.The newly named defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims against them were time-barred because they were not named before the statute of limitations expired and the plaintiff had not complied with Ohio Civil Rule 15(D), which governs the naming and service of unknown defendants. The Richland County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion, holding that the statutory 180-day extension for joining additional defendants in medical-claim actions did not apply to defendants who were “obvious” at the outset and that the plaintiff was required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D). The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the statutory extension applied to any additional defendants not named in the original complaint, regardless of whether their existence was contemplated at filing.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the appellate court’s decision. It held that a plaintiff is not required to comply with Civil Rule 15(D) to name additional defendants in an amended complaint under R.C. 2323.451(D)(1), and that the 180-day extension under R.C. 2323.451(D)(2) is not limited to newly discovered defendants. Because the plaintiff properly amended her complaint to join the additional defendants, the extension applied and her action was timely commenced. View "Lewis v. MedCentral Health Sys." on Justia Law