Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Theresa Johnson, individually and as executor of her deceased husband Nathaniel Johnson's estate, filed a wrongful-death action against Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc. Nathaniel, suffering from COVID-19, was admitted to Jackson Hospital on November 26, 2020. He was placed on a BiPAP device for breathing assistance. On December 6, 2020, he was to be moved to another floor. During the transfer, the BiPAP device was removed, and an oxygen mask was allegedly placed on him. However, Nathaniel experienced distress and died shortly after.The Montgomery Circuit Court initially granted Jackson Hospital's motion for summary judgment, but later set it aside to allow further discovery. Johnson argued that Jackson Hospital's actions were wanton and did not comply with public health guidance. The trial court ultimately denied Jackson Hospital's renewed motion for summary judgment, holding that Johnson's action could proceed under an exception in the Alabama Covid Immunity Act (ACIA).The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case. It found that Jackson Hospital was immune from Johnson's negligence claims under the ACIA and the May 8 proclamation issued by Governor Ivey, which provided liability protections for health-care providers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The court also determined that Johnson did not present clear and convincing evidence of wanton conduct by Jackson Hospital's staff. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Alabama granted Jackson Hospital's petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the trial court to enter a summary judgment in favor of Jackson Hospital on all claims. View "Ex parte Jackson Hospital & Clinic, Inc." on Justia Law

A wrongful-death medical-malpractice action was initiated by Donna Ratliff, representing the estate of Rhoda Gail McBride, against Dr. Frances Koe and Wills Valley Family Medicine, LLC. McBride had sought treatment for leg pain and was diagnosed with a blood clot, for which she was prescribed Coumadin, a blood thinner. McBride's daughter, Ratliff, claimed that neither she nor McBride were adequately informed about the necessity of regular blood tests to monitor the medication's effects. McBride subsequently suffered a fatal brain bleed due to "Coumadin toxicity."The DeKalb Circuit Court jury returned a verdict in favor of Dr. Koe and Wills Valley. However, the trial court granted Ratliff's motion for a new trial, vacating the jury's verdict. The trial court concluded that the defendants had not presented sufficient evidence to support their contributory-negligence defense, which alleged that McBride's failure to attend follow-up appointments contributed to her death.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's judgment. The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the contributory-negligence defense, including testimony that McBride had been informed about the need for regular blood tests and the dangers of Coumadin. The court held that the jury's verdict was supported by the evidence and that the trial court had erred in granting a new trial. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Koe v. Ratliff" on Justia Law

Aletha Porcaro was admitted to The Heights of Summerlin, a skilled nursing facility, for rehabilitation after surgery. Upon her discharge, she contracted COVID-19 and died eight days later. Her daughter, Rachelle Crupi, filed a lawsuit against The Heights and its parent companies, alleging that they failed to implement effective COVID-19 safety protocols. The claims included negligence, wrongful death, and other related causes of action.The Heights removed the case to federal court, which remanded it back to state court. In state court, The Heights moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and Nevada’s Emergency Directive 011 granted them immunity from Crupi’s claims. The district court dismissed the professional negligence claim but allowed the other claims to proceed.The Heights then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, seeking to dismiss the remaining claims based on the same immunity arguments. The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the petition and concluded that the PREP Act does not apply to a lack of action or failure to implement COVID-19 policies. The court also determined that Directive 011 does not grant immunity to health care facilities, as it applies to individual medical professionals, not facilities.The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition for a writ of mandamus, holding that neither the PREP Act nor Directive 011 provided immunity to The Heights for the claims brought by Crupi. The court affirmed the district court’s decision to allow the remaining claims to proceed. View "The Heights of Summerlin, LLC v. District Court" on Justia Law

In 2021, Hal de Becker contracted COVID-19 and was treated with ivermectin by his personal physician. Hal was later admitted to Desert Springs Hospital Medical Center, where his ivermectin treatment was stopped without consent, and he was administered remdesivir. Hal's condition deteriorated, and he died shortly after being discharged. Hal's family sued the attending doctors and the hospital, alleging negligence, professional negligence, and wrongful death, claiming the doctors and hospital failed to obtain informed consent and made treatment decisions based on media narratives.The Eighth Judicial District Court dismissed the claims against the doctors and the hospital. The court found that the claims against the doctors were barred by the Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) and that the expert affidavit provided by the plaintiffs did not meet the requirements of NRS 41A.071. The court also dismissed the claims against the hospital, finding them similarly barred by the PREP Act and that the claims were for professional negligence rather than ordinary negligence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that the plaintiffs' claims were for professional negligence and required an expert affidavit under NRS 41A.071. The court found the expert affidavit insufficient as to the doctors because it did not specify acts of negligence separately for each doctor. However, the affidavit was sufficient as to the hospital. Despite this, the court concluded that the PREP Act barred the claim against the hospital because it related to the administration of remdesivir, a covered countermeasure. Therefore, the dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "De Becker v. UHS of Delaware, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves Paul Passafiume, as the independent administrator of the estate of Lois Passafiume, who filed a professional negligence complaint against Daniel Jurak, D.O., and others, alleging wrongful death and survival actions due to negligent care leading to Lois's death in 2014. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where the plaintiff sought damages for loss of material services beyond his remarriage in 2015.In the Grundy County circuit court, the defendants filed a motion in limine to limit the testimony of the plaintiff’s expert witness, economist Stan Smith, regarding the loss of material services to the period before the plaintiff’s remarriage. The court denied this motion, allowing evidence of loss of material services beyond the remarriage. The jury awarded the plaintiff $2,121,914.34 in damages, later reduced due to contributory negligence. The defendants' posttrial motion for a new trial or remittitur was denied, leading to an appeal.The Appellate Court, Third District, affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that a plaintiff’s remarriage does not limit damages for loss of material services in a wrongful death action. The defendants then appealed to the Supreme Court of Illinois.The Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed the appellate court's judgment, holding that in a wrongful death claim under the Wrongful Death Act, a plaintiff’s remarriage does not affect the recoverable damages for the loss of a decedent’s material services. The court overruled previous appellate decisions that had incorporated material services into loss of consortium claims, which terminate upon remarriage. The court maintained that material services remain a separate element of pecuniary damages under the Act, unaffected by remarriage. View "Passafiume v. Jurak" on Justia Law

Mark Glen Spencer died from sepsis two days after a surgical procedure performed by Dr. Lana Nelson at Norman Regional Medical Authority. Spencer's brother, Jimmy Wayne Spencer, acting as the Special Administrator of the estate, filed a wrongful death action against the hospital and Dr. Nelson, alleging negligent and grossly negligent treatment. The hospital delayed providing complete medical records, which were essential for evaluating the claim.The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the potential claim before the statutory deadline and that Dr. Nelson, as a hospital employee, was immune from individual liability under the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA). The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that the discovery rule did not apply to wrongful death claims under the GTCA and that Dr. Nelson could not be individually sued for actions within the scope of her employment.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Civil Appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule applies to wrongful death actions arising from medical negligence under the GTCA. It also ruled that governmental employees have no immunity under the GTCA for gross negligence or acts outside the scope of employment. The court found that the trial court erred in making factual determinations on a motion to dismiss and that it should have taken the plaintiff's allegations as true. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with these findings. View "SPENCER v. NELSON" on Justia Law

Daniel McCurry and Carie Powell sued Dr. Inder Singh for malpractice, alleging he violated a duty of care by refusing to treat their mother, Carol McCurry, who died while awaiting transfer to another hospital. Carol was brought to Methodist Hospital with shortness of breath and was diagnosed with an aortic dissection and a possible heart attack. Dr. Michael Brandon, the treating emergency physician, consulted Dr. Singh, an on-call interventional cardiologist at Mercy General Hospital. Dr. Singh initially agreed that Carol needed acute catheterization but later decided she was not a candidate for the procedure. Consequently, Dr. Singh did not accept her transfer, and Carol died before she could be transferred to another facility.The Superior Court of Sacramento County granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh, ruling that he did not owe a duty of care to Carol because no physician-patient relationship existed between them. The court found that Dr. Singh did not affirmatively treat or directly advise Carol, and thus, no legal duty was established.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that a physician's duty of care arises only when a physician-patient relationship is established, which did not occur in this case. Dr. Singh's consultation with Dr. Brandon and his decision not to treat Carol did not create such a relationship. The court also declined to apply the reasoning from an Arizona case cited by the plaintiffs, emphasizing that under California law, the duty of care is contingent upon the existence of a physician-patient relationship. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Dr. Singh was affirmed. View "McCurry v. Singh" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Quintez Talley, an incarcerated individual, sought in forma pauperis (IFP) status to appeal without prepaying filing fees. The appellees argued that the "three strikes" provision of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) barred Talley from proceeding IFP, claiming that three of his previous cases were dismissed on grounds that qualify as strikes under the PLRA. Talley contended that only one of these cases constituted a strike.The United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's federal claim for failure to state a claim and his medical malpractice claim for not complying with Pennsylvania procedural rules. The court did not dismiss the entire action on strike-qualifying grounds, so this case did not count as a strike. In another case, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania dismissed Talley's complaint for failure to state a claim but granted him leave to amend. Talley did not amend within the deadline, but the court did not formally close the case before Talley filed his notice of appeal, so this case also did not count as a strike. In a third case, the same court dismissed Talley's claims for failure to state a claim and noted his failure to file a certificate of merit for his medical malpractice claim. This dismissal was on strike-qualifying grounds, making it a strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that only one of Talley's previous cases constituted a strike. The court held that the dismissal of the medical malpractice claim for procedural non-compliance did not qualify as a strike, and the case where Talley was given leave to amend but did not do so was not formally closed, thus not a strike. The court granted Talley's motion to proceed IFP, allowing him to appeal without prepaying filing fees. View "Talley v. Pillai" on Justia Law

Lavonne S. Mottern died after receiving a contaminated intravenous injection at Princeton Medical Center, operated by Baptist Health System, Inc. (BHS). Donald J. Mottern, as administrator of Lavonne's estate, filed claims against BHS, Meds I.V., LLC (the manufacturer of the injection), and three individuals associated with Meds I.V. The claims against Meds I.V. and the individuals were settled, leaving only the claims against BHS, which included negligence, wantonness, a claim under the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine (AEMLD), and a breach of implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).The Jefferson Circuit Court dismissed all of Mottern's claims against BHS, including the negligence and wantonness claims, which BHS conceded should not have been dismissed. BHS argued that the AEMLD and UCC claims were subject to the Alabama Medical Liability Act (AMLA) and required proof of a breach of the standard of care. The trial court agreed and dismissed these claims, leading to Mottern's appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case and agreed with BHS that all of Mottern's claims, including those under the AEMLD and UCC, are subject to the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions. The court held that the AMLA applies to all actions for medical injury, regardless of the theory of liability, and requires proof of a breach of the standard of care. The court reversed the trial court's dismissal of the negligence and wantonness claims and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The main holding is that the AMLA's standard-of-care provisions apply to all claims alleging medical injury, including those under the AEMLD and UCC. View "Mottern v. Baptist Health System, Inc." on Justia Law