Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

After experiencing ongoing struggles with gender identity, a young adult sought a double mastectomy and was informed by the surgical clinic that a letter from a mental health practitioner was required to proceed. The petitioner requested this letter from her therapist, who had previously counseled her on unrelated matters. The therapist provided a letter recommending the surgery on February 22, 2021. Their therapeutic relationship ended on May 14, 2021. The petitioner underwent surgery on June 11, 2021, subsequently suffered medical complications, and later regretted the procedure. In 2023, she filed suit against the therapist and the therapist’s employer, alleging negligence and fraud in the issuance of the recommendation letter, and sought to hold the employer vicariously and directly liable.The case was first adjudicated in a Texas district court, where the respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the petitioner’s claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for health care liability claims under Section 74.251(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The district court granted summary judgment and severed the claims, making the decision final as to the therapist and her employer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the recommendation letter was provided.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of the statute of limitations. The Court held that, under Section 74.251(a), a claim is timely if filed within two years of the completion of the relevant health care treatment or the occurrence of the tort. Here, treatment concluded on May 14, 2021, and the alleged injury occurred on June 11, 2021, when the surgery was performed. Because the petitioner gave notice of her claims within two years of these events, her suit was not time-barred. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ALDACO v. WOOD" on Justia Law

A twenty-one-month-old child suffered seizures and respiratory distress after a fall at home. His mother called 911, and basic life support EMTs arrived, followed by advanced life support paramedics. The paramedics, employed by Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, administered medications and attempted multiple intubations to open his airway. They communicated twice by phone with Dr. Niti Sharma, a licensed emergency physician, who gave them orders to administer drugs and to intubate the child. After several unsuccessful intubation attempts and continued resuscitation efforts, the child was transported into the hospital, where he was reintubated and resuscitated. He was discharged with an anoxic brain injury and other significant health repercussions.Plaintiffs, the child’s parents, sued Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, its paramedics, and other related parties, alleging negligence and reckless conduct caused the injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing immunity under New Jersey’s Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), which shields paramedics from civil liability when they perform advanced life support services “in good faith” and “in accordance with” the EMSA. The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment, finding the paramedics followed physician orders and maintained appropriate communication. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the paramedics’ actions met statutory requirements for immunity, and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that frequent or continuous communication with the physician was required.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether the paramedics acted “in accordance with the act” for purposes of statutory immunity. The Court held that the paramedics maintained direct voice communication and took orders from a licensed physician as required by the EMSA, and that the statute does not mandate continuous communication or specific recontact criteria. The Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, granting them immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14. View "Almonte v. Township of Union" on Justia Law

After a prolonged labor, a mother delivered her son at a hospital, with the child experiencing respiratory distress requiring intubation shortly after birth. The mother alleged that the child’s injuries resulted from medical malpractice by the hospital and two physicians involved in her care during labor and delivery. One physician initially managed her labor, then transferred care to another physician, and later resumed care the following morning, at which point he ordered an emergency cesarean section after being notified of fetal distress.During the litigation, the mother’s medical expert provided a report stating that all involved providers, including both physicians and the nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section on the evening prior to delivery, a time when the physician in question was not present. The physician moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert's report did not implicate him in the alleged malpractice. In response, the mother submitted an affidavit from the same expert, which incorporated the prior report but added a new opinion that the physician breached the standard of care by not performing a cesarean within thirty minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress on the morning of delivery. The physician moved to strike this affidavit, arguing it contradicted the prior expert report and was submitted only to create an issue of fact.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to strike the affidavit and entered summary judgment for the physician. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit’s new opinion was contradictory and could be disregarded under the sham-affidavit rule.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment. It held that when an expert incorporates an earlier report into a sworn affidavit, the court may consider both documents together for summary judgment purposes. If the affidavit contradicts the report without sufficient explanation, the trial court acts within its discretion to strike it under the sham-affidavit rule. View "Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

A woman died after complications from surgery to remove an ovarian cyst, during which her bowel was perforated. Following the procedure, she received post-operative care from several doctors, who were later sued by her husband and daughter. The plaintiffs, acting as statutory wrongful death plaintiff and administrator of the estate, brought claims for wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and medical expenses. Several defendants settled before trial, but Dr. Leigh, Dr. Shirley, and their practice went to trial. The jury awarded substantial damages: $29,250,000 for the value of the decedent’s life, $2,500,000 for pain and suffering, and $1,715,176 for medical expenses.After the verdict, the defendants moved for a new trial and to reduce (“remit and amend”) the judgment based on a statutory cap on noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases (OCGA § 51-13-1(b)). The State Court of Bibb County denied the new trial but granted the motion to remit, reducing the wrongful death award to $350,000 under the statutory cap, while leaving pain and suffering and medical expenses unchanged.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the defendants to invoke the damages cap for the first time in post-trial motions. The court reaffirmed Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery, P.C. v. Nestlehutt, concluding that Georgia’s constitutional right to a jury trial prohibits applying OCGA § 51-13-1(b)’s cap to noneconomic damages for pain and suffering in medical malpractice actions. Statutory construction principles, in light of Nestlehutt, prevent the cap from being applied to a verdict that includes such damages. The Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s reduction of the wrongful death award and remanded for consideration of an unresolved excessiveness argument. View "CLARK v. LEIGH" on Justia Law

A woman died in a hospital after giving birth by cesarean section, having suffered a rare and severe complication known as placenta accreta spectrum, which led to a massive hemorrhage. She underwent an emergency hysterectomy and was transferred to the intensive care unit for postoperative management. Her condition deteriorated, resulting in respiratory and cardiac arrest, and she died the following morning. Her fiancé, acting as administrator of her estate, and a conservator for her children, brought a medical malpractice and wrongful death lawsuit against multiple medical providers and the hospital. Most defendants settled before trial, leaving only one doctor and a medical staffing agency as defendants.In the Superior Court of Rockdale County, the plaintiffs presented expert testimony alleging breaches of the standard of care by the remaining defendants. The jury found both liable and awarded $42 million in total damages: $10 million for pain and suffering to the estate and $32 million for wrongful death to the children. The trial court entered judgment accordingly, denied the defendants’ post-trial motions for a new trial, and refused to apply Georgia’s statutory cap on noneconomic damages, finding it unconstitutional and waived due to the defendants’ failure to raise it earlier. The court also granted the plaintiffs’ request for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, awarding over $11 million.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. It held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain defense expert testimony or in granting the challenged jury instruction, as the defendants had affirmatively waived any instructional error. The court affirmed that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages could not constitutionally be applied to the judgment. Finally, it upheld the award of attorney fees, finding that the plaintiffs’ settlement offer complied with statutory requirements and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount. The judgment was affirmed. View "CAYAMCELA v. ADVOCACY TRUST, LLC" on Justia Law

After Charlene Jorgensen underwent two breast reduction surgeries by Dr. Adam Smith, she and her husband filed suit in May 2020, alleging the second surgery in 2018 was negligently performed and left Charlene disfigured. Their claims included medical negligence and lack of informed consent against Dr. Smith, medical negligence and respondeat superior against Smith’s professional corporation, and negligent retention and respondeat superior against Tri-State Specialists, LLP. The plaintiffs timely served a certificate of merit affidavit from Dr. Mark Jewell, which addressed Dr. Smith’s surgical care, but did not specifically address negligent retention by Tri-State.The Iowa District Court for Woodbury County denied the defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment, which challenged the negligent retention claim based on Iowa Code section 147.140 and section 668.11, arguing the certificate of merit affidavit was insufficient. The defendants sought interlocutory review. In a prior appeal (Jorgensen I), the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding that section 147.140 did not apply to the negligent retention claim and distinguishing Struck v. Mercy Health Services-Iowa Corp. The Court also found section 668.11 did not bar the negligent retention claim since Tri-State was not a licensed professional under the statute.Following remand, the defendants filed two further summary judgment motions challenging the sufficiency and applicability of the certificate of merit affidavit. The district court again denied these motions, and the defendants appealed. The Supreme Court of Iowa, applying the law-of-the-case doctrine, concluded that issues or matters necessarily decided in the prior appeal could not be re-examined. The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the summary judgment motions and remanded the case for trial, holding that the law-of-the-case doctrine barred reconsideration of the certificate of merit issues and applicability of section 147.140 to the negligent retention claim. View "Jorgensen v. Smith" on Justia Law

A woman experiencing severe back pain visited the emergency department at a hospital in Pocatello, Idaho, where she was treated by a physician assistant under the supervision of an emergency medicine physician. She received pain medications, including a transdermal fentanyl patch. After being discharged and returning to the hospital the next day, she was again treated and had another fentanyl patch administered. Subsequently, her orthopedic surgeon prescribed additional fentanyl patches to manage her pain. Her husband applied two more patches at home as instructed. The woman died several days later, with her death certificate listing respiratory depression and acute fentanyl intoxication as causes.The woman’s family filed a medical malpractice lawsuit in Idaho’s Sixth Judicial District Court against the hospital, the emergency department providers, the orthopedic surgeon, and others, alleging negligent treatment and failure to obtain informed consent. The defendants requested disclosure of the identities of any non-testifying local experts consulted by the plaintiffs’ out-of-state expert witnesses regarding the local standard of care. The plaintiffs refused, citing concerns for the consultants’ professional standing, and sought a protective order, which was denied. The district court struck the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses for failing to timely disclose the local consultants, and then granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding the plaintiffs could not prove breach of the standard of care or causation.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s decision to strike the expert witnesses for discovery violations, holding that Idaho law requires disclosure of non-testifying local standard-of-care experts, regardless of the degree of reliance by testifying experts. However, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s summary judgment on causation, holding that plaintiffs need only show the general risk of harm was foreseeable, not the specific mechanism of injury. The case was remanded for further proceedings against the hospital on the remaining negligence claim. The Court also awarded partial attorney fees to certain defendants for defending an aspect of the appeal deemed frivolous. View "Hartman v. Pocatello Hospital" on Justia Law

Brooke Morton was admitted to the hospital at 37 weeks gestation for labor induction due to cystic fibrosis-induced diabetes. After complications, her baby, Brody Morton, was delivered by emergency cesarean section, resuscitated, transferred to the NICU, and passed away five hours later. Mrs. Morton suffered severe postpartum complications. Mr. Morton consented to an autopsy, allegedly under the impression it would be performed by the state medical examiner, but later learned it was conducted by the hospital, with internal organs not preserved, preventing further autopsy.The Mortons sent two pre-suit notices and screening certificates of merit to the hospital, one for medical negligence related to labor and delivery, and another for emotional distress and related claims concerning the autopsy and handling of organs. The hospital responded by requesting more definite statements and identifying perceived deficiencies, following procedures established in Hinchman v. Gillette. The Mortons replied with additional certificates. The complaint included claims against both the hospital and the West Virginia University Board of Governors (WVUBOG). After mediation, the Mortons settled medical negligence claims with WVUBOG, but not with the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) applied and the certificates were deficient, depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed some claims but denied dismissal of emotional distress claims, finding MPLA did not apply.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the hospital’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court held that while total failure to provide pre-suit notice under the MPLA is jurisdictional, alleged deficiencies in a screening certificate of merit do not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The writ of prohibition was denied, and the circuit court’s order stands. View "State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Simms" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought treatment at a hospital for abdominal pain in January 2018. Multiple medical professionals reviewed his CT scan, which showed a suspected mass on his kidney, but none documented or communicated this abnormal finding to him or to other medical staff. He was discharged without being informed of the mass. Over the next several years, other doctors also failed to alert him to the mass despite reviewing his earlier scans. In July 2021, a new MRI revealed a kidney mass, later confirmed to be cancer, resulting in the removal of his right kidney. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit in September 2023.In district court in Linn County, the plaintiff filed certificates of merit to support his claim. After the Iowa Supreme Court decided Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp., which clarified the requirements for such certificates, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the certificates were defective. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice and filed a new but identical lawsuit within six months, citing Iowa’s savings statute, Iowa Code § 614.10. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure of the first suit was not compelled and was due to the plaintiff’s own negligence in prosecuting the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the savings statute did apply. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to provide compliant certificates of merit was not due to negligence, as the legal requirements were unsettled prior to Miller. Additionally, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to resist summary judgment with futile arguments. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

A mother consented to have an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist perform surgery on her two-year-old son, but was not informed that a fourth-year medical resident would assist with or perform the procedure. After surgery, the child suffered internal bleeding, was hospitalized twice, and ultimately died from a hemorrhage related to the site of the surgery. The mother, both individually and as administrator for her son’s estate, sued the ENT doctor and his employer for medical negligence in postoperative care and for failure to secure informed consent regarding the resident’s participation.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the action with prejudice. The court determined that the certificate of merit (COM) submitted by the plaintiffs did not comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because it was not signed under oath or penalty of perjury, following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives–Iowa, Corp. The district court concluded that a COM was required for all claims, including the informed-consent claim, and rejected arguments that the defendants had waited too long to challenge the COM or that subsequent affidavits could cure the original defect.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a COM is not required for a claim alleging lack of informed consent, reversing the district court’s dismissal of that claim. The court reasoned that Iowa’s "patient rule" for informed consent focuses on the information a reasonable patient would want, and expert testimony is not required to establish a prima facie case for lack of informed consent regarding who performs the surgery. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the medical negligence claims due to noncompliance with the COM requirements and rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and procedural arguments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the informed-consent claim only. View "Lofgren v. Simpson" on Justia Law