Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

Brooke Morton was admitted to the hospital at 37 weeks gestation for labor induction due to cystic fibrosis-induced diabetes. After complications, her baby, Brody Morton, was delivered by emergency cesarean section, resuscitated, transferred to the NICU, and passed away five hours later. Mrs. Morton suffered severe postpartum complications. Mr. Morton consented to an autopsy, allegedly under the impression it would be performed by the state medical examiner, but later learned it was conducted by the hospital, with internal organs not preserved, preventing further autopsy.The Mortons sent two pre-suit notices and screening certificates of merit to the hospital, one for medical negligence related to labor and delivery, and another for emotional distress and related claims concerning the autopsy and handling of organs. The hospital responded by requesting more definite statements and identifying perceived deficiencies, following procedures established in Hinchman v. Gillette. The Mortons replied with additional certificates. The complaint included claims against both the hospital and the West Virginia University Board of Governors (WVUBOG). After mediation, the Mortons settled medical negligence claims with WVUBOG, but not with the hospital. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing that the Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) applied and the certificates were deficient, depriving the circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The Circuit Court of Monongalia County dismissed some claims but denied dismissal of emotional distress claims, finding MPLA did not apply.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the hospital’s petition for a writ of prohibition. The Court held that while total failure to provide pre-suit notice under the MPLA is jurisdictional, alleged deficiencies in a screening certificate of merit do not deprive a circuit court of subject matter jurisdiction. The writ of prohibition was denied, and the circuit court’s order stands. View "State ex rel. West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Simms" on Justia Law

The plaintiff sought treatment at a hospital for abdominal pain in January 2018. Multiple medical professionals reviewed his CT scan, which showed a suspected mass on his kidney, but none documented or communicated this abnormal finding to him or to other medical staff. He was discharged without being informed of the mass. Over the next several years, other doctors also failed to alert him to the mass despite reviewing his earlier scans. In July 2021, a new MRI revealed a kidney mass, later confirmed to be cancer, resulting in the removal of his right kidney. The plaintiff filed a medical malpractice suit in September 2023.In district court in Linn County, the plaintiff filed certificates of merit to support his claim. After the Iowa Supreme Court decided Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa Corp., which clarified the requirements for such certificates, the defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the certificates were defective. The plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the case without prejudice and filed a new but identical lawsuit within six months, citing Iowa’s savings statute, Iowa Code § 614.10. The district court dismissed the second suit, holding that the savings statute did not apply because the failure of the first suit was not compelled and was due to the plaintiff’s own negligence in prosecuting the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the savings statute did apply. The court found that the plaintiff’s failure to provide compliant certificates of merit was not due to negligence, as the legal requirements were unsettled prior to Miller. Additionally, it was not necessary for the plaintiff to resist summary judgment with futile arguments. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Trask v. Ahmed" on Justia Law

A mother consented to have an ear, nose, and throat (ENT) specialist perform surgery on her two-year-old son, but was not informed that a fourth-year medical resident would assist with or perform the procedure. After surgery, the child suffered internal bleeding, was hospitalized twice, and ultimately died from a hemorrhage related to the site of the surgery. The mother, both individually and as administrator for her son’s estate, sued the ENT doctor and his employer for medical negligence in postoperative care and for failure to secure informed consent regarding the resident’s participation.The Iowa District Court for Johnson County dismissed the action with prejudice. The court determined that the certificate of merit (COM) submitted by the plaintiffs did not comply with Iowa Code section 147.140 because it was not signed under oath or penalty of perjury, following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives–Iowa, Corp. The district court concluded that a COM was required for all claims, including the informed-consent claim, and rejected arguments that the defendants had waited too long to challenge the COM or that subsequent affidavits could cure the original defect.The Supreme Court of Iowa held that a COM is not required for a claim alleging lack of informed consent, reversing the district court’s dismissal of that claim. The court reasoned that Iowa’s "patient rule" for informed consent focuses on the information a reasonable patient would want, and expert testimony is not required to establish a prima facie case for lack of informed consent regarding who performs the surgery. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the medical negligence claims due to noncompliance with the COM requirements and rejected the plaintiffs’ constitutional and procedural arguments. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the informed-consent claim only. View "Lofgren v. Simpson" on Justia Law

While detained at the McLean County Detention Center, Dirk Alan Christianson developed a severe leg infection that ultimately resulted in the amputation of his leg above the knee. During his incarceration, Christianson sought medical attention several times and was treated both within and outside the jail, including being evaluated by a jail nurse and a family nurse practitioner. After displaying symptoms such as fever and pain, Christianson was transported to an outside clinic where he was evaluated, tested, and given instructions for follow-up. His condition deteriorated over the next several days, leading to hospitalization, a diagnosis of necrotizing fasciitis, and amputation.Christianson brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota against McLean County, jail officials, medical staff, and the outside clinic, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs, Monell municipal liability, and state law medical malpractice. The district court dismissed the Monell and medical malpractice claims, granted summary judgment to all defendants on the deliberate indifference claims, and denied Christianson’s motion to amend his complaint to identify and add John Doe defendants.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The appellate court held that Christianson failed to allege facts sufficient to support municipal liability under Monell, as the complaint did not set forth a specific policy or widespread custom causing constitutional harm. The court also determined that the evidence did not support claims of deliberate indifference by the sheriff, jail nurse, or family nurse practitioner, finding no facts showing that these individuals knew of and disregarded a serious medical need. Additionally, the court ruled that Christianson’s motion to amend was untimely and properly denied, and that dismissal of the John Doe defendants was appropriate. Finally, the court affirmed dismissal of the state law medical malpractice claim, concluding that the required expert affidavit was not timely served. View "Christianson v. McLean County" on Justia Law

A patient suffered an injury during knee surgery in March 2022 and, together with his wife, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against the operating surgeon and the orthopedic clinic in January 2023. Iowa law requires medical malpractice plaintiffs to serve a certificate of merit affidavit within sixty days after the defendant’s answer to the lawsuit. The plaintiffs served a certificate of merit within the deadline. However, the document was not sworn before an authorized officer and did not include the phrase “penalty of perjury” as required by Iowa statutes. Over a year later, the plaintiffs served an amended certificate that met the affidavit requirements, but it was well past the statutory deadline.After the defendants answered and discovery proceeded for more than a year, the defendants moved to dismiss in the Iowa District Court for Polk County, arguing that the timely certificate did not comply with statutory requirements. The district court found that the initial certificate was neither a true affidavit nor a permissible substitute under the relevant statutes. The court also concluded that the late-filed, proper affidavit could not cure the statutory violation because it was not filed within the required sixty days and there was no extension by agreement or motion. The district court dismissed the case.The Iowa Supreme Court reviewed the appeal. It held that substantial compliance with the certificate of merit affidavit requirement means providing either a true affidavit executed before an authorized person or a statement under penalty of perjury within sixty days. The plaintiffs failed to do either within the deadline, and their later submission could not cure the defect. The court also rejected arguments that the defendants had waived the affidavit requirement or that the statutory scheme violated the Iowa Constitution. The decision of the district court was affirmed. View "Rarick v. Smidt" on Justia Law

After a woman was injured in a car accident and treated at a hospital, an X-ray suggested a lung nodule, and her medical records recommended a chest CT scan for further investigation. No CT scan was ordered or performed, and she was released. Almost two years later, after suffering a femur fracture, a CT scan at a different hospital revealed cancer, and she subsequently passed away. Her husband and children, representing themselves and her estate, brought a wrongful-death medical malpractice suit against the hospital and multiple providers, alleging failure to properly follow up on the lung nodule.In the Iowa District Court for Scott County, the plaintiffs timely served certificates of merit as required by Iowa Code section 147.140, but these certificates were neither notarized nor included a statement that they were signed under penalty of perjury. Following the Iowa Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Catholic Health Initiatives-Iowa, Corp., the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the certificates did not satisfy statutory requirements. The plaintiffs resisted, providing new expert statements but maintaining these were not amendments. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice. After the death of one of the original plaintiffs, his son was appointed as executor and administrator for the estates. Notices of appeal were filed, initially signed by the non-lawyer administrator.The Supreme Court of Iowa first determined that the estates’ appeal should not be dismissed due to the unauthorized practice of law in filing the notice of appeal, since counsel promptly appeared and continued representation. On the substantive issue, the court was evenly divided on whether the district court correctly dismissed the suit for noncompliance with section 147.140. As a result, the dismissal was affirmed by operation of law. The motion to dismiss the appeal was denied, but the district court judgment was affirmed. View "Willhoite v. Genesis Health System" on Justia Law

A patient was admitted to a hospital with acute pancreatitis and later transferred to the critical care unit, where he received continuous dialysis through a catheter. A nurse on his care team failed to properly secure the dialysis tubing and fastened it to the bedrail without adequate slack. When the patient was repositioned, the catheter was pulled from his neck, leading to air entering the line and causing cardiac arrest. The patient’s wife, who was present, later filed a lawsuit as executor of his estate, alleging that the nurse was negligent and that the hospital was both vicariously liable for the nurse’s actions and directly negligent in retaining her, given her involvement in a previous patient death. The wife also sought damages for her own emotional distress as a bystander and requested punitive damages.The Iowa District Court for Polk County denied the hospital’s motion for summary judgment on the claims for negligent retention, bystander emotional distress, and punitive damages. The district court held that Iowa law allowed a negligent retention claim even where the employer had stipulated to vicarious liability for the employee’s conduct, found that there was a triable issue as to whether the wife contemporaneously perceived the negligent event for emotional distress damages, and concluded that punitive damages could not be ruled out as a matter of law.The Iowa Supreme Court reversed the district court’s denial of summary judgment and remanded the case. The court held that when an employer does not dispute vicarious liability for an employee’s conduct, claims for negligent hiring, retention, or supervision are precluded. The court also held that the wife’s claim for bystander emotional distress failed as a matter of law because she did not contemporaneously perceive the injury-producing event. Finally, the court concluded there was insufficient evidence for punitive damages against the hospital or the nurse. View "Baldwin v. Central Iowa Hospital Corp." on Justia Law

The plaintiff, a lawyer, visited Suburban Hospital in Maryland in October 2015 with abdominal pain and other symptoms. He was diagnosed with gallbladder disease and underwent surgery performed by Dr. Daee, who was presented to him as a hospital agent or employee. Complications from that surgery led to a second operation at a different hospital a month later, where alleged medical malpractice was discovered. During subsequent litigation, the plaintiff learned in May 2022 that Dr. Daee was not a hospital employee but an independent contractor, and that the hospital may have misrepresented this relationship.The plaintiff first filed a medical malpractice action against the hospital and Dr. Daee in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland in 2020. In 2022, after discovering new information, he tried to amend his complaint to add fraud and conspiracy claims, but the district court denied this request. He then filed a separate lawsuit in May 2023, alleging fraudulent misrepresentation and conspiracy to commit fraud regarding the hospital’s representations about Dr. Daee’s status. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the claims were barred by Maryland’s five-year statute of limitations for medical malpractice under the Health Care Malpractice Claims Act. The district court agreed and dismissed the complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court applied the incorrect statute of limitations. It determined that the plaintiff’s fraud and conspiracy claims were not traditional malpractice claims and should be governed by Maryland’s general three-year statute of limitations for civil actions, not the five-year period for medical malpractice. The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal order and remanded the case for further proceedings, without deciding whether the claims were timely under the correct statute. View "Brunenkant v. Suburban Hospital, Inc." on Justia Law

A young man, Austin Ghaphery, began exhibiting signs of substance abuse in 2016 and admitted to his father, Dr. Nicholas Ghaphery, that he was using illicit drugs in 2017. Dr. Ghaphery arranged for his son to undergo an initial assessment at Wheeling Treatment Center (WTC), a medication-assisted treatment facility that treats opioid addiction. During the assessment, a counselor conducted a drug screen and determined that Austin was not a candidate for admission because he was not in opioid withdrawal and his drug screen was negative for opioids. However, concerns about possible suicidal ideation were raised during the assessment, prompting WTC’s medical director, Dr. Schultz, to evaluate Austin for suicide risk. After Austin agreed to follow up with his family physician, he was released. He was not admitted into the MAT program. Thirty-six days later, Austin died from a drug overdose.Dr. Ghaphery, as personal representative of Austin’s estate, sued WTC and Dr. Schultz for medical professional liability and wrongful death, alleging that they failed to properly evaluate Austin’s condition and arrange for his transportation to a psychiatric facility. The Circuit Court of Ohio County initially denied summary judgment but later granted it, concluding that no health care provider-patient relationship existed after WTC declined to admit Austin, and thus WTC and Dr. Schultz owed him no legal duty. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirmed, holding that any health care provided was merely incidental and did not give rise to such a relationship or duty.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case and reversed. It held that a health care provider-patient relationship was established during the initial assessment, even though Austin was not ultimately admitted for ongoing treatment. Therefore, WTC and Dr. Schultz owed a duty of care to Austin during the assessment process. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Ghaphery v. Wheeling Treatment Center" on Justia Law

The appellant filed a lawsuit alleging medical malpractice and gross negligence against several healthcare providers and associated entities. The Superior Court of the District of Columbia dismissed the complaint, finding it barred by the statute of limitations and for failure to state a claim. After the dismissal, the appellant sought to file a notice of appeal but missed the standard thirty-day deadline, asserting that he did not receive timely notice of the dismissal order due to administrative errors, including misdirected court communications. He filed a motion for leave to late file his notice of appeal, claiming excusable neglect or good cause due to these circumstances.Upon review of the appellant’s motion, the Superior Court denied the request. The court relied on D.C. App. R. 4(a)(7), which allows reopening the time to appeal under limited circumstances, including a fourteen-day deadline after notice of the judgment. Because the motion was filed more than fourteen days after the appellant learned of the judgment, the trial court found it untimely under this provision. The court also cited potential prejudice to appellees from having to defend a “frivolous” appeal.The District of Columbia Court of Appeals vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the trial court erred by applying the timing requirements of Rule 4(a)(7) when the motion was properly brought under Rule 4(a)(5), which provides a different standard for extensions based on excusable neglect or good cause and does not impose the same fourteen-day limit. The appellate court further clarified that the merits of the underlying case and the ordinary burden of defending an appeal are not relevant factors in assessing such motions. View "Newton v. Grajny" on Justia Law