Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A surgery center performed a liposuction procedure on April Jenkins, who died during the operation. Her father, Hal Jenkins, engaged in negotiations with the center’s insurer, Prime Insurance Company, regarding liability. The policy had a $50,000 per occurrence limit, which decreased as Prime Insurance paid defense costs. After months of negotiations, Hal Jenkins sued the surgery center, CLJ Healthcare, LLC, and Prime Insurance offered the remaining policy limit. Jenkins rejected the offer. Subsequently, Jenkins learned of a separate $2 million policy through another insurer, Owners Insurance Company, and demanded payment from both insurers. Owners Insurance denied coverage. Jenkins and CLJ Healthcare entered into an agreement where Jenkins would receive an assignment of CLJ’s potential bad faith claim against Prime Insurance and CLJ would not defend itself in Jenkins’s malpractice suit. Jenkins then obtained an uncontested $60 million judgment against CLJ.Jenkins and CLJ sued Prime Insurance in the United States District Court for the District of Utah, alleging bad faith. The district court initially found the claim time-barred, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding the claim timely and remanded the case. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for Prime Insurance, concluding the evidence did not show bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that, under Utah law, an insurer generally has no duty to explain policy terms absent ambiguity or fraud, and Prime Insurance’s actions—including offering the policy limit and communicating with the insured—did not constitute bad faith. The Tenth Circuit concluded that Jenkins and CLJ had not provided evidence sufficient to support a claim of bad faith against Prime Insurance. View "Jenkins v. Prime Insurance" on Justia Law

A husband and wife brought a lawsuit against a physician and his employer after the husband, working as a surgical technologist, was exposed to HIV-positive blood during a cardiac procedure. The exposure occurred when the physician discharged blood onto a sterile drape rather than into a splash bin, causing blood to splash into the husband’s eye. Following this incident, the husband underwent antiviral treatment with significant side effects and endured months of anxiety and medical testing, which also affected his marriage.The plaintiffs filed five claims, including negligence, assault, battery, unfair business practices, and loss of consortium (the latter on behalf of the wife only), in the Riverside County Superior Court. The defendants demurred to four of the claims and moved to strike several forms of relief. The trial court overruled the demurrer as to negligence but sustained it with leave to amend for the other challenged claims, and struck certain relief such as punitive damages. Before the amendment period expired, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed all their claims with prejudice, expressly to expedite an appeal of the trial court’s orders. After the clerk entered the dismissal, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal. The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that a voluntary dismissal is not an appealable judgment.The Supreme Court of California reviewed the matter and held that when a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action before the court has issued a final resolution as to any pleaded claim, the dismissal terminates the action and forfeits the right to appeal. The Court clarified that such a dismissal is a ministerial act, not a judgment that confers appellate jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeal’s dismissal of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Maniago v. Desert Cardiology Consultants' Medical Group" on Justia Law

A child born via surrogate suffered a brachial plexus injury during delivery, allegedly caused by shoulder dystocia due to her large size. The physician, who managed the surrogate’s prenatal care and performed the delivery, was accused of failing to disclose certain risks and alternatives—such as the option of cesarean section—to the surrogate and the child’s parents. The child, through a guardian ad litem, and her parents filed suit against the physician and his insurer, raising claims for negligence and for failure to obtain informed consent. Prior to trial, the parents’ claims and those against certain other defendants were dismissed by stipulation. The child’s claim focused on whether the physician had a legal duty to provide information and obtain informed consent regarding her care, as well as the surrogate’s.The Winnebago County Circuit Court granted partial summary judgment to the defendants on the informed consent claim, finding that only the surrogate was the physician’s patient and that the claim could only be brought through her. The child’s negligence claim proceeded to a jury, which found the physician was not negligent and awarded no damages. The child appealed only the summary judgment dismissal of the informed consent claim, arguing that she independently qualified as a patient entitled to informed consent under Wisconsin law. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals certified the question to the Supreme Court, seeking clarification on whether an unborn or minor child is a “patient” under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 and entitled to informed consent with an independent right to legal action.The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the child was a patient under Wis. Stat. § 448.30 before her birth. The physician owed a duty to obtain informed consent from the surrogate for both herself and the child. Upon being born alive, the child had an independent right to pursue an informed consent claim. The Court reversed the circuit court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings on the child’s informed consent claim. View "Brekke v. Midwest Medical Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A patient filed a medical malpractice action after a surgery was performed on her uninjured foot instead of her injured foot. The surgeon settled and was dismissed from the case prior to trial, and the case against the hospital proceeded to a jury trial. The jury awarded the patient substantial economic and noneconomic damages, apportioning 65% of the fault to the hospital and 35% to the surgeon. The hospital moved to reduce the noneconomic damages to the statutory cap, and the patient challenged the constitutionality of this cap.The District Court of Williams County held that the statutory cap on noneconomic damages was constitutional and reduced the noneconomic damages accordingly. The court apportioned fault and entered an amended judgment in favor of the patient, reflecting the statutory cap and including interest and costs. The hospital paid the full amount of the amended judgment, and the patient accepted payment and filed a satisfaction of judgment, though the satisfaction did not strictly comply with statutory requirements. Later, the patient filed a notice of appeal, challenging the constitutionality of the statutory cap, and the hospital filed a conditional cross-appeal regarding allocation of damages.The Supreme Court of North Dakota determined that by accepting full payment of the amended judgment and filing a satisfaction—without reserving any right to appeal—the patient waived her right to appeal. The court clarified that in non-divorce cases, voluntarily accepting the full amount of a judgment without expressly preserving any appellate issues constitutes waiver of the right to appeal. As a result, both the patient’s appeal and the hospital’s cross-appeal were dismissed. The court expressly abrogated any contrary rule suggested by the earlier decision in Tyler v. Shea, 4 N.D. 377, 61 N.W. 468 (1894). View "Cowan v. Slann" on Justia Law

A woman died from a pulmonary embolism roughly 30 days after undergoing knee replacement surgery. Her estate, through its personal representative, filed a medical malpractice suit in the Oakland Circuit Court against the operating surgeon, his orthopedic practice, and the hospital where the surgery occurred. The estate alleged that the surgeon negligently failed to prescribe a prescription-strength anticoagulant. The complaint was accompanied by an affidavit of merit from an orthopedic surgeon, attesting to his qualifications during the relevant time period. The estate timely identified this surgeon as its expert witness, but difficulty arose when he became unavailable for deposition. The estate attempted to substitute a new expert on its witness list without seeking court approval, prompting litigation over whether this substitution should be permitted.The Oakland Circuit Court struck the amended witness list and ordered the estate to produce the original expert for deposition. When the estate could not do so, it sought to amend its witness list and moved for voluntary dismissal, both of which the circuit court denied. The court found that the estate had not acted diligently, determined the affidavit of merit was invalid due to the expert’s lack of recent practice, and granted summary disposition in favor of the defendants, closing the case.The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the circuit court abused its discretion by considering only prejudice when denying the motion to amend the witness list and failing to apply the factors from Dean v Tucker. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the correct standard for amending a witness list is the “good-cause” standard of MCR 2.401(I)(2), not the Dean factors. The Supreme Court found that the circuit court abused its discretion under the good-cause standard and that summary disposition was prematurely granted. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Harris v. Beaumont Health" on Justia Law

A 21-year-old college student experienced COVID-19 symptoms and subsequently developed chest pain, shortness of breath, and lightheadedness. After testing positive for COVID-19 at urgent care, he sought emergency treatment at a hospital where the physician noted pleuritic chest pain and performed diagnostic tests, including an EKG and chest x-ray, both showing abnormalities. Due to hospital COVID-19 protocols, his mother was unable to convey his family history of a blood clotting disorder to the physician. The patient was discharged without a pulmonary embolism diagnosis and died twenty days later from cardiac arrest caused by a pulmonary embolism with underlying COVID-19.The parents filed a wrongful death and medical negligence suit in the District Court of Oklahoma County against the hospital, physician, and emergency services group. The defendants argued immunity under both Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Public Health Emergency Limited Liability Act and the federal Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act). The trial court denied summary judgment on both immunity claims, rejected the PREP Act defense at trial, denied the Oklahoma COVID-19 Act immunity as a matter of law, and granted a directed verdict for the parents on intervening/supervening causation. The jury found negligence, awarded damages, and attributed contributory negligence to the decedent.The Supreme Court of the State of Oklahoma held that the defendants are immune from liability for ordinary negligence under Oklahoma’s COVID-19 Act because the patient was impacted by the facility’s COVID-19 policies, and the trial court erred by not granting a directed verdict on this immunity. However, the Court held that PREP Act immunity does not apply because the alleged injury was not causally related to the administration or use of covered countermeasures. The Court also affirmed the trial court’s handling of intervening/supervening causation. The judgment of the district court was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "BURGESS v. INTEGRIS HEALTH EDMOND, INC." on Justia Law

A patient underwent a gallbladder removal surgery in Idaho Falls in 2019, performed by a board-certified general surgeon. The patient alleged that the procedure resulted in severe complications, including organ lacerations and emergency transport for further care. He claimed that the surgeon’s actions fell below the applicable community standard of care and filed a medical malpractice lawsuit. To support his claim, the patient sought to present testimony from an out-of-area, board-certified medical expert, who stated he had familiarized himself with the local standard of care by consulting a local surgeon practicing in the Idaho Falls/Pocatello area.The Seventh Judicial District Court of Idaho, Bonneville County, reviewed the affidavits submitted by the out-of-area expert. The court struck both the original and amended affidavits, finding that neither sufficiently demonstrated the expert’s foundation to testify regarding the community standard of care. The affidavits lacked specific information about the local surgeon’s familiarity with the Idaho Falls community standard and did not establish whether Idaho Falls and Pocatello were overlapping medical communities. As a result, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant surgeon, concluding that the plaintiff had not presented admissible evidence on a necessary element of his claim. The court also awarded the defendant costs under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).The Supreme Court of the State of Idaho affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that Idaho law requires out-of-area experts to demonstrate actual knowledge of the community standard of care, including showing how they became familiar with it, and that board-certified physicians are not automatically subject to a national standard. The court found the affidavits insufficient and upheld the grant of summary judgment and the award of costs to the defendant. The court also denied the plaintiff’s request for attorney fees on appeal. View "HEATH v. OLAVESON" on Justia Law

After experiencing ongoing struggles with gender identity, a young adult sought a double mastectomy and was informed by the surgical clinic that a letter from a mental health practitioner was required to proceed. The petitioner requested this letter from her therapist, who had previously counseled her on unrelated matters. The therapist provided a letter recommending the surgery on February 22, 2021. Their therapeutic relationship ended on May 14, 2021. The petitioner underwent surgery on June 11, 2021, subsequently suffered medical complications, and later regretted the procedure. In 2023, she filed suit against the therapist and the therapist’s employer, alleging negligence and fraud in the issuance of the recommendation letter, and sought to hold the employer vicariously and directly liable.The case was first adjudicated in a Texas district court, where the respondents sought summary judgment, arguing that the petitioner’s claims were time-barred by the two-year statute of limitations for health care liability claims under Section 74.251(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. The district court granted summary judgment and severed the claims, making the decision final as to the therapist and her employer. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Second District of Texas affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the recommendation letter was provided.The Supreme Court of Texas reviewed the case and concluded that the lower courts erred in their interpretation of the statute of limitations. The Court held that, under Section 74.251(a), a claim is timely if filed within two years of the completion of the relevant health care treatment or the occurrence of the tort. Here, treatment concluded on May 14, 2021, and the alleged injury occurred on June 11, 2021, when the surgery was performed. Because the petitioner gave notice of her claims within two years of these events, her suit was not time-barred. The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "ALDACO v. WOOD" on Justia Law

A twenty-one-month-old child suffered seizures and respiratory distress after a fall at home. His mother called 911, and basic life support EMTs arrived, followed by advanced life support paramedics. The paramedics, employed by Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, administered medications and attempted multiple intubations to open his airway. They communicated twice by phone with Dr. Niti Sharma, a licensed emergency physician, who gave them orders to administer drugs and to intubate the child. After several unsuccessful intubation attempts and continued resuscitation efforts, the child was transported into the hospital, where he was reintubated and resuscitated. He was discharged with an anoxic brain injury and other significant health repercussions.Plaintiffs, the child’s parents, sued Atlantic Ambulance Corporation, its paramedics, and other related parties, alleging negligence and reckless conduct caused the injuries. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing immunity under New Jersey’s Emergency Medical Services Act (EMSA), which shields paramedics from civil liability when they perform advanced life support services “in good faith” and “in accordance with” the EMSA. The Superior Court, Law Division, granted summary judgment, finding the paramedics followed physician orders and maintained appropriate communication. The Appellate Division affirmed, concluding the paramedics’ actions met statutory requirements for immunity, and rejected plaintiffs’ argument that frequent or continuous communication with the physician was required.The Supreme Court of New Jersey reviewed whether the paramedics acted “in accordance with the act” for purposes of statutory immunity. The Court held that the paramedics maintained direct voice communication and took orders from a licensed physician as required by the EMSA, and that the statute does not mandate continuous communication or specific recontact criteria. The Court affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, granting them immunity under N.J.S.A. 26:2K-14. View "Almonte v. Township of Union" on Justia Law

After a prolonged labor, a mother delivered her son at a hospital, with the child experiencing respiratory distress requiring intubation shortly after birth. The mother alleged that the child’s injuries resulted from medical malpractice by the hospital and two physicians involved in her care during labor and delivery. One physician initially managed her labor, then transferred care to another physician, and later resumed care the following morning, at which point he ordered an emergency cesarean section after being notified of fetal distress.During the litigation, the mother’s medical expert provided a report stating that all involved providers, including both physicians and the nursing staff, deviated from the standard of care by not advocating for a cesarean section on the evening prior to delivery, a time when the physician in question was not present. The physician moved for summary judgment, arguing that the expert's report did not implicate him in the alleged malpractice. In response, the mother submitted an affidavit from the same expert, which incorporated the prior report but added a new opinion that the physician breached the standard of care by not performing a cesarean within thirty minutes of receiving reports of fetal distress on the morning of delivery. The physician moved to strike this affidavit, arguing it contradicted the prior expert report and was submitted only to create an issue of fact.The Stark County Court of Common Pleas granted the motion to strike the affidavit and entered summary judgment for the physician. The Fifth District Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding that the affidavit’s new opinion was contradictory and could be disregarded under the sham-affidavit rule.The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment. It held that when an expert incorporates an earlier report into a sworn affidavit, the court may consider both documents together for summary judgment purposes. If the affidavit contradicts the report without sufficient explanation, the trial court acts within its discretion to strike it under the sham-affidavit rule. View "Moore v. Mercy Med. Ctr." on Justia Law