Justia Medical Malpractice Opinion Summaries

A woman, acting as personal representative of her late husband's estate, brought a medical negligence action after her husband died following treatment at the University of South Alabama Hospital. She alleged that various doctors and U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC (HCM) failed to provide adequate care, leading to his death. HCM employed the hospital staff involved and was created by the University of South Alabama (USA) to manage its healthcare system. The plaintiff claimed HCM was vicariously liable for the doctors’ alleged negligence.HCM moved for dismissal or summary judgment in the Mobile Circuit Court, arguing it was entitled to State immunity based on its relationship to USA, a State institution. HCM presented affidavits and documentation showing USA was its sole member and manager, and that HCM’s finances were intertwined with USA. The plaintiff opposed, arguing HCM was a separately created LLC under Alabama law, formed to shield USA from certain liabilities, and operated as an independent entity. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HCM, finding it was entitled to immunity, and later certified the judgment as final for appeal.The Supreme Court of Alabama reviewed the case de novo. It examined whether HCM, as an LLC created by a State agency, qualified as a State agency for purposes of immunity under Article I, § 14, of the Alabama Constitution. Applying the factors from Armory Commission of Alabama v. Staudt, the court determined HCM’s powers and functions were typical of private entities, not unique to government, and its relationship with USA did not override its separate legal status as an LLC. The court held HCM was not entitled to State immunity and reversed the circuit court’s summary judgment, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Marsh v. U.S.A. Healthcare Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Linda Fay Campbell underwent kidney surgery at St. Dominic-Jackson Memorial Hospital, during which her colon was unintentionally perforated. Campbell subsequently required additional surgery by Dr. Jeffery Glover to address the perforation. Later, a surgical sponge was discovered in Campbell’s abdomen from the prior surgery, requiring yet another operation by Dr. Glover. Campbell initially filed a medical-negligence personal injury suit against Dr. Tanaka, Dr. Glover, and St. Dominic. She passed away while the suit was pending, and her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries sought to pursue claims related to her death and pre-death injuries.After Campbell’s death, her attorneys filed a suggestion of death and indicated an amended complaint would be filed on behalf of her estate and wrongful death beneficiaries. However, the motion to substitute parties was not timely under Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 25. The parties agreed to dismiss Dr. Tanaka with prejudice and later dismissed the original suit without prejudice, preserving claims for wrongful death. Torrie Campbell Knight, as administratrix, then filed a new complaint alleging wrongful death against Dr. Glover and others. As discovery progressed, St. Dominic and Dr. Tanaka were dismissed, leaving Dr. Glover as the sole defendant. Dr. Glover moved for summary judgment, arguing that no act or omission by him proximately caused Campbell’s death and that any personal injury claims were barred.The Supreme Court of Mississippi reviewed whether the wrongful death complaint adequately pled a separate personal-injury-survival claim. The Court held that the complaint only asserted a wrongful death claim under the wrongful death statute and did not include a distinct personal-injury-survival claim. Therefore, the Court found summary judgment for Dr. Glover was proper, reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, reinstated, and affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County. View "Knight v. Glover" on Justia Law

Two separate cases were filed in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County by administrators of the estates of deceased individuals who died while incarcerated in West Virginia regional jails. The plaintiffs alleged that jail staff and medical providers failed to respond to the decedents’ serious medical needs, resulting in death or injury. Both complaints included claims against the West Virginia Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation (DCR) for negligence, negligent training, and “deliberate indifference in violation of clearly established West Virginia law,” but explicitly disclaimed reliance on federal law or constitutional claims, instead seeking damages under state common law.DCR moved to dismiss the deliberate indifference counts, arguing that West Virginia common law does not recognize a standalone cause of action for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law.” The Circuit Court denied the motions, concluding that such a claim was recognized by prior West Virginia Supreme Court decisions and supported by decisions from the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA). DCR then filed petitions in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia seeking writs of prohibition to prevent enforcement of the circuit court orders denying dismissal.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the matter and granted the writs of prohibition. The Court held that a claim for damages for “deliberate indifference to clearly established law” is not cognizable under the common law of West Virginia. The Court determined that prior decisions, including Nobles v. Duncil, did not establish such a cause of action, but rather recognized deliberate indifference as a legal standard in constitutional claims, most often under federal law. The orders by the Circuit Court were found to be clearly erroneous as a matter of law and thus were prohibited from enforcement. View "State ex rel. Division of Corrections and Rehabilitation v. Salango" on Justia Law

After being injured in a motorcycle accident, the plaintiff was transported to a designated trauma center and diagnosed with a thoracic vertebra fracture. Initially, a non-surgical treatment was recommended, but the defendant physician offered surgery as an alternative, which the plaintiff chose. Following surgery, the plaintiff suffered permanent paraplegia. He later experienced a stroke, and his life care plan was updated to reflect increased needs after this event. The plaintiff sued the physician for medical negligence, alleging failures in preoperative and intraoperative care, and sought compensatory damages. At trial, issues arose regarding the timeliness and scope of expert witness disclosures, as well as the connection between the surgery and later stroke.In the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, a jury found for the plaintiff, awarding substantial damages and finding the physician not only negligent but reckless. The court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law, including arguments that West Virginia’s Medical Professional Liability Act (MPLA) “Trauma Cap” should limit damages. The defendant appealed, challenging the court’s rulings on the Trauma Cap and procedural matters. The West Virginia Intermediate Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in part, but reversed on one issue: it found the trial court abused its discretion by striking a late-disclosed expert opinion on life expectancy, and remanded for a new trial solely on damages.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the case. It held that the physician bore the burden to invoke and prove the factual predicates for the Trauma Cap’s application, which he failed to do. The court affirmed that the MPLA Trauma Cap did not apply and upheld most trial court rulings. However, it reversed the appellate court’s order for a new trial on damages, finding no abuse of discretion in striking the late life expectancy expert opinion. The September 12, 2022, judgment was reinstated. View "Orphanos v. Rodgers" on Justia Law

The case involves claims brought by the parents and step-parents of a minor, S.A., against a medical professional, Regina Bias, and her employer, Logan Regional Medical Center. The plaintiffs allege that Ms. Bias, a certified pediatric sexual assault nurse examiner, deviated from appropriate medical standards during an evaluation for sexual abuse and falsely reported positive findings, including a sexually transmitted disease, to the Department of Human Services. These alleged false reports resulted in the extended removal of S.A. and a half-sibling from their homes and perpetuated ongoing abuse and neglect proceedings. Plaintiffs claim the defendants financially benefited from repeat examinations and that Ms. Bias ultimately recanted her findings when testifying under oath. The underlying abuse and neglect proceedings were later dismissed after a judicial finding that S.A. was not sexually abused.In the Circuit Court of Mingo County, the defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaints, arguing that they were entitled to statutory “good faith” immunity under West Virginia Code § 49-2-810 for actions taken pursuant to the Child Welfare Act. They asserted that the plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged bad faith or knowledge to overcome this immunity. The circuit court denied the motions to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged false reporting and that the issue of good faith was a factual question requiring discovery. The court invited the defendants to raise the immunity issue again after discovery.The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reviewed the interlocutory appeal and dismissed it for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The court held that statutory immunity from liability under West Virginia Code § 49-2-810 does not meet the requirements for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine, as it does not constitute immunity from suit or a right not to be tried, nor does it implicate a substantial public interest requiring immediate review. The appeal was therefore dismissed as interlocutory. View "Logan Regional Medical Center v. A.J." on Justia Law

A woman, acting as administrator of her late husband’s estate and in her individual capacity, filed a medical malpractice action against multiple doctors and medical practices. The complaint alleged that after an MRI detected a lesion on her husband’s kidney in 2017, recommended follow-up care was not pursued by his medical providers. In 2020, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer and died within months. The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ failure to act constituted a breach of the standard of care. Before trial, some defendants were dismissed, and the case proceeded to a jury trial against several remaining doctors and practices.During jury selection, the plaintiff’s counsel challenged four prospective jurors for cause, arguing that their responses during voir dire showed they could not be fair and impartial or would not follow the law as instructed by the court. The trial court denied these for-cause challenges, finding the prospective jurors’ answers did not establish actual bias or unwillingness to follow the law. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict for the defendants. The plaintiff appealed to the Second District Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court. The appellate court reviewed the trial court’s denial of the for-cause challenges under an abuse-of-discretion standard.The Supreme Court of Ohio reviewed the case. It held that under R.C. 2313.17(B)(9), when a principal challenge is made to a prospective juror on grounds of bias or unwillingness to follow the law, the trial court must determine the validity of the challenge, and, if valid, the juror must be absolutely disqualified. The court overruled prior precedent to the extent it permitted discretion at this stage. However, it found that competent, credible evidence supported the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not valid. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeals. View "Estate of Price v. Kidney Care Specialists, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Pamela Smith died after surgery at Lovelace Medical Center, operated by Lovelace Health System, LLC. Smith’s estate brought wrongful death claims against Lovelace, asserting both direct negligence and vicarious liability based on the conduct of Lovelace’s employed registered nurses. Lovelace was a “qualified health care provider” (QHP) under the New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act (MMA), but its employed registered nurses were not, nor could they be under the version of the Act in effect at the time.The Plaintiff sought summary judgment in the Second Judicial District Court, arguing that the MMA did not apply to claims based on the conduct of non-QHP registered nurses, and therefore Lovelace was not entitled to the MMA’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The District Court agreed, granting summary judgment and concluding that Lovelace was not entitled to the Act’s benefits regarding its nurse employees’ actions. Lovelace sought interlocutory appeal; the New Mexico Court of Appeals denied review, but the Supreme Court of New Mexico granted certiorari.The Supreme Court of New Mexico reviewed the statutory construction de novo. It held that the plain language of the MMA covers vicarious liability claims against QHPs, regardless of whether the agent (here, a nurse) is a QHP, so long as the agent’s conduct constitutes medical treatment or a departure from accepted standards resulting in injury. The Court rejected the argument that only the conduct of a QHP can be the basis for a malpractice claim under the MMA, and affirmed that Lovelace is entitled to the Act’s protections—including the damages cap—for vicarious liability claims arising from nurse conduct. The summary judgment in favor of Plaintiff was reversed. View "Ferlic v. Lovelace Health Sys., LLC" on Justia Law

A woman with an enlarged lymph node was initially diagnosed by a pathologist as having metastatic breast cancer. However, subsequent imaging and tests did not confirm a breast origin and suggested lymphoma as a possible diagnosis. Her treating oncologist, despite access to these conflicting findings, did not consult further with pathology or pursue additional investigation, and instead proceeded to treat her for breast cancer with chemotherapy and radiation. After about a year, her cancer had advanced, and a later biopsy revealed she actually had ALK positive large B-cell lymphoma, a rare and aggressive cancer. She then received appropriate treatment but did not respond positively and died. The plaintiffs, her husband and her estate, alleged that the oncologist breached the standard of care by failing to properly diagnose and consult, resulting in delayed proper treatment and increased harm.The case was first tried in the Court of Common Pleas of York County, resulting in a mistrial. At retrial, after the plaintiffs presented their evidence, the defendants moved for compulsory nonsuit, which the trial court granted, finding insufficient evidence of causation. The plaintiffs’ post-trial motions were denied, and judgment was entered for the defendants. On appeal, the Superior Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for a new trial, concluding there was sufficient expert evidence under Pennsylvania’s “increased risk of harm” standard to permit the case to go to the jury.The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Middle District, reviewed whether the Superior Court correctly applied the “increased risk of harm” standard from Hamil v. Bashline. The Court held that the Superior Court properly applied this relaxed causation standard, finding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony sufficient to establish a prima facie case that the oncologist’s conduct increased the risk of harm. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s decision, requiring the case be submitted to the jury. View "Estate of Smith v. Kannarkatt" on Justia Law

Charles L. Hinkel, III experienced chest pain at home and, after his son called 911, emergency responders Kristian Brock (an EMT) and Christopher Stone (a paramedic) were dispatched to assist. They used a phone app called “Active 911” for navigation, but due to darkness, rain, and poor lighting, they initially missed the house, arriving about sixteen minutes after dispatch. After bringing Hinkel to the ambulance, he suffered cardiac arrest, and the defibrillator malfunctioned. The responders stopped at another paramedic’s home to get a working defibrillator and continued resuscitation, but Hinkel was pronounced dead at the hospital. Hinkel’s estate sued Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, alleging negligence related to their navigation choices and equipment checks.The Henry Circuit Court dismissed claims against Henry County EMS and the defendants in their official capacities but denied summary judgment for Brock and Stone in their individual capacities, finding their actions involved ministerial duties not protected by qualified official immunity. Rather than immediately appealing, Brock and Stone proceeded to trial, which ended in a mistrial. Afterward, they filed an interlocutory appeal regarding the denial of immunity. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.On discretionary review, the Supreme Court of Kentucky held that Brock and Stone forfeited their right to an interlocutory appeal by proceeding to trial rather than appealing the immunity denial before trial. The Court clarified that once trial begins, the summary judgment record is superseded and further appellate review of immunity must occur on the trial record, not the pretrial record. The Court also found it lacked appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine in these circumstances. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case to the Henry Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "BROCK V. HINKEL" on Justia Law

The plaintiff experienced serious medical complications after being misdiagnosed by his primary care provider, a physician assistant. Initially presenting with abdominal pain and urinary issues, the plaintiff was diagnosed with urinary retention and prescribed medication. His condition worsened, leading to emergency hospitalization where it was determined he had acute diverticulitis, resulting in a perforated bowel and septic shock. The plaintiff sued the physician assistant for negligence, alleging that the examination and treatment were deficient and caused significant injuries.The Iowa District Court for Dallas County reviewed the case. The plaintiff had submitted a certificate of merit affidavit, required under Iowa law for medical malpractice actions, signed by a physician board-certified in surgery. The defendant argued, and the district court agreed, that this expert was not qualified to opine on the standard of care for a physician assistant practicing family medicine, as the fields and certifications were deemed too distinct. The court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of a qualified expert.The Iowa Supreme Court considered whether a physician is qualified to serve as an expert in a malpractice case against a physician assistant under Iowa Code section 147.139. Applying a categorical approach established in Jones v. Lindell, the court held that “field” in the statute is defined by licensure rather than specialty or area of practice. It determined that physicians and physician assistants are licensed to practice in substantially similar fields because their scopes of practice, education, and statutory definitions overlap significantly. The court concluded the physician was a qualified expert and reversed the district court's dismissal, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Davenport v. Fuller" on Justia Law